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H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) was one of the most important avian
diseases in poultry production of China, especially in Guangdong province. In recent
years, new H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) still emerged
constantly, although all poultry in China were immunized with H5N1 vaccinations
compulsorily. To better understand the pathogenicity and transmission of dominant
clades of the H5N1 HPAIVs in chicken from Guangdong in 2012, we chose a clade 7.2
avian influenza virus named A/Chicken/China/G2/2012(H5N1) (G2) and a clade 2.3.2.1
avian influenza virus named A/Duck/China/G3/2012(H5N1) (G3) in our study. Our results
showed that the chickens inoculated with 103 EID50 of G2 or G3 viruses all died, and
the titers of virus replication detected in several visceral organs were high but different. In
the naive contact groups, virus shedding was not detected in G2 group and all chickens
survived, but virus shedding was detected in G3 group and all chickens died. These
results showed that the two clades of H5N1 HPAIVs had high pathogenicity in chickens
and the contact transmission of them was different in chickens. The results of cross
reactive HI assay showed that antigens of G2 and G3 were very different from those of
current commercial vaccines isolates (Re-4, Re-6, and D7). And to evaluate the protective
efficacy of three vaccines against most isolates form Guangdong belonging to clade
2.3.2.1 in 2012, G3 was chosen to challenge the three vaccines such as Re-4, Re-6, and
D7. First, chickens were immunized with 0.3ml Re-4, Re-6, and D7 inactivated vaccines
by intramuscular injection, respectively, and then challenged with 106 EID50 of G3 on day
28 post-vaccination. The D7 vaccine had 100% protection against G3 for chickens, the
Re-6 vaccine had 88.9%, and the Re-4 vaccine only had 66.7%. Our results suggested
that the D7 vaccine could prevent and control H5N1 virus outbreaks more effectively in
Guangdong. From the above, it was necessary to conduct continuously epidemiological
survey and study the pathogenicity and antigenic variation of avian influenza in Southern
China.
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INTRODUCTION
Influenza A viruses are the most important pathogen of three
types (A, B, and C) of influenza viruses, to both the poultry
industry and human health. To date, avian influenza viruses
representing 16 HA and 9 NA subtypes have been detected in
wild birds and poultry throughout the world (Webster et al.,
1992; Fouchier and Munster, 2009). According to the virulence
of viruses, avian influenza viruses are divided into highly
pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV), low pathogenic avian
influenza virus (LPAIV), and non-pathogenic avian influenza
virus (NPAIV). However, only some influenza viruses of H5 and
H7 subtype are highly pathogenic to poultry.
The H5N1 HPAIV was first isolated in Guangdong, China in
1996 (Xu et al., 1999). In 1997, H5N1 HPAIVs had repeatedly
caused serious outbreaks among poultry farms and markets in
Hong Kong, which resulted in heavy losses. And it was the
first report that H5N1 HPAIV infected human in “Hong Kong
Flu” in 1997, causing six deaths in 18 infection cases (Claas
et al., 1998; Subbarao et al., 1998). In 2002, a new H5N1 HPAI
outbreak in Hong Kong infected millions of birds, including
several types of wild water fowl. This was the first time the
H5N1 HPAIV was found to infect water fowl (Lee et al., 2005;
Nguyen et al., 2005). Between 2003 and 2005, the H5N1 HPAI
repetitively broke out in East Asia and South Asia, and even
spread to Europe and Africa. This resulted in more than 150
million birds dead or slaughtered and 53 human fatalities (Sturm-
Ramirez et al., 2004; World Health Organization, 2005). Since
2003, the H5N1 HPAI had continued influencing more than 60
states or areas including Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Hong Kong,
and China (World Health Organization, 2013b). From 2003 to
1 May 2015, 840 laboratory-confirmed human cases of H5N1
HPAIVs infection were officially reported to WHO from 16
countries; of these cases, 447 died (World Health Organization,
2015). Consequently, H5N1 HPAIVs are zoonotic etiological
agents recognized as a severe threat to both the poultry industry
and human public health around the world.
In terms of antigenic characteristics, H5N1 HPAIVs were
divided into 10 clades (0–9) and numerous subclades by
World Health Organization/World Organization for Animal
Health/Food and Agriculture Organization H5N1 Evolution
Working Group (2008)1. Complicated breeding environments,
the long distance transport of live poultry, and wild bird
migration resulted in all known clades circulating endlessly
in poultry in China. Especially during 2005 and 2006, H5N1
viruses of clades 2.2, 2.3.2, 2.3.4, 4, 7, and 9 circulated all
over China. Since 2007, viruses of clades 2.3.2, 2.3.4, and
7 have predominantly co-circulated continuously in domestic
poultry and waterfowl in China (Smith et al., 2009; Jiang et al.,
2010; Li et al., 2010). Later, several studies results showed
that the pathogenicity of clade 2.3.2 viruses were intensifying
in aquatic birds (Sakoda et al., 2010). Viruses of clade 7
began spreading in chickens across the northern of China in
2005, which had a high pathogenicity in chickens, but only a
1Food and Agricultural Organization(FAO). H5N1 HPAI Global Overview - July
and August 2010, prepared by EMPRESS/GLEW, Issues No. 24.
few viruses were isolated from aquatic birds. In 2008, H5N1
HPAI caused clade 7.2 viruses broke out in several cities in
North China and caused a considerable amount of deaths in
poultry. In 2010, a new H5N1 HPAIV belonging to clade 2.3.2.1
was isolated from South Asia, and 48 humans were reported
to have been infected with the virus (Reid et al., 2011). In
2011, the H5N1 HPAI caused clade 2.3.2.1 viruses broke out
in crows (World Health Organization, 2012). From 2012 to
2013, the H5N1 HPAIVs belonging to 2.3.2.1, 2.3.4, and 7.2
clades were detected in birds and/or environmental samples
in China (World Health Organization, 2013a), but the most
isolates belonged to clade 2.3.2.1. The pathogenicity of different
clades varied in poultry and wild birds, but the movement and
interaction of H5N1 viruses between them was still not clear
until now.
To better understand the pathogenicity and
transmissibility of different clade of H5N1 isolates
from poultry in Guangdong in 2012, we selected two
viruses—A/Chicken/China/G2/2012(H5N1) (G2) and
A/Duck/China/G3/2012(H5N1) (G3)—to carry out
their infection experiments. To evaluate the antigenic
variation of these viruses and protective efficacy of current
commercial vaccines against most isolates from Guangdong
in 2012, G3 (belonging to clade 2.3.2.1) was chosen to
challenge three commercial vaccines such as Re-4, Re-6,
and D7.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
H5N1 HPAIV Variants and Propagation
The two H5N1 HPAIVs—A/Chicken/China/G2/2012(H5N1)
(G2) and A/Duck/China/G3/2012(H5N1) (G3)—used in this
study were isolated from cloacal swabs of apparently healthy
birds in live bird markets during 2012. They were purified
and propagated by three rounds of limiting dilution in the
allantoic cavity of 9–11 days old specific-pathogen-free (SPF)
embryonated chicken eggs (Jiao et al., 2014; Yuan et al.,
2014). The allantoic fluid from multiple eggs was pooled,
clarified by centrifugation, and frozen in aliquots at −70◦C.
The G2 and G3 inactivated antigens and positive serums were
provided by College of Veterinary Medicine, South China
Agricultural University. The 50% egg infectious dose (EID50)
was calculated according to the method published by Reed and
Muench (1938) using the serial titration of eggs. All experiments
were carried out in Animal Biosafety Level 3 (ABSL-3)
facilities.
Genetic and Phylogenetic Analyses
The viral RNA was extracted from the allantoic fluid supernatant
using Trizol LS Reagent (Life Technologies, Inc.). A reverse
transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) was
conducted using Superscript III (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA,
USA) and Uni12 (5-AGCAAAAGCAGG-3) primer. Eight
genes were amplified using universal primers (Hoffmann et al.,
2001), and the PCR products were purified using the mini
PCR Purification Kit (Promega). Sequencing was performed by
Shanghai Invitrogen Biotechnology Co., Ltd. The sequencing
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data were compiled with the Seqman program of Lasergene
7 (DNASTAR, Inc.). Amino acid sequence similarities were
identified with the Lasergene 7 Megalign program (DNASTAR).
The hemagglutinin (HA) gene phylogenetic tree of the H5N1
HPAIVs was created with MEGA 5 software (Sinauer Associates,
Inc., Sunderland, MA).
The nucleotide sequences of A/Chicken/China/G2/
2012(H5N1) (G2) and A/Duck/China/G3/2012(H5N1) (G3)
were available from GenBank under the accession numbers
KU851866-KU851867.
Pathogenicity and Transmission
Five-week-old SPFWhite Leghorn chickens were purchased from
Beijing Merial Vital Laboratory Animal Technologies Co., LTD,
Beijing, China.
To determine the pathogenicity and transmission of the two
H5N1 HPAIVs, twenty-seven chickens were equally divided
into three groups G2, G3, and control. Six chickens of G2
and G3 group were inoculated intranasally with 103 EID50 of
G2 or G3 viruses, respectively; the other three chickens of
each group were inoculated intranasally with the same volume
of phosphate buffered saline (PBS), as naive contact housed
with the inoculated chickens. The chickens of control group
were inoculated intranasally with the same volume of PBS. All
chickens were observed for clinical symptoms for 14 days. Three
inoculated chickens in each groupwere euthanized at 3 days post-
inoculation (DPI), and the lungs, kidneys, liver, heart, spleen,
and brain were collected. Similar executions were performed on
chickens that died during the observation. Oropharyngeal and
cloacal swabs were collected from all chickens at 3, 5, 7, 9, and
11 DPI, and suspended in 1ml isolation media PBS (pH 7.4).
All of the tissues and swabs were collected and titrated for virus
infectivity in eggs, as described previously (Chen et al., 2004;
Jiao et al., 2008). Seroconversion of the surviving chickens on
14 DPI was confirmed by hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) test.
HI titers of the serums were detected using 1% chicken red
blood cells by a standard method (Takatsy and Barb, 1973).
All animal experiments were conducted under the guidance
of SCAU’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.
Our animal experiments in this study had been approved by
SCAU and were carried out in high-efficiency particulate air-
filtered isolators (size: 2200 × 850 × 1700mm) and ABSL-3
facilities.
Vaccine-Challenge
To evaluate the antigenic variation of these viruses and protective
efficacy of current commercial vaccines against most isolates
from Guangdong in 2012, 3-week-old SPF White Leghorn
chickens were purchased from Beijing Merial Vital Laboratory
Animal Technologies Co., LTD, Beijing, China. Re-4 and
Re-6 vaccines strain inactivated antigens, positive serums, and
vaccines were purchased from Weike Biotechnology Co., Ltd.,
Harbin, China. D7 (H5N2) vaccines strain inactivated antigens,
positive serums, and vaccines were purchased from Guangzhou
South China Biological Medicine Co. Ltd., Guangdong,
China.
Thirty-six chickens were divided into four groups (n = 9),
and three groups were immunized with 0.3ml of Re-4, Re-
6, or D7 inactivated vaccines via intramuscular injection, the
control group received 0.3ml of PBS intramuscularly. Serum was
collected from every chicken on 14 and 28 day-post-vaccination
(DPV) for HI titers determination.
At 28 DPV, chickens were intranasally challenged with
200ul 106EID50 of A/Duck/China/G3/2012(H5N1) (G3).
Oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were taken on days 3, 5, 7,
9, and 11 post-challenge, including chickens that died during
this period. All swabs were immediately suspended in 1ml
isolation media PBS, which were inoculated into 9–10 days old
embryonated chicken eggs for examination of virus shedding.
All surviving chickens were observed for clinical symptoms for
14 days and collected serum for seroconversion detection in the
end.
RESULTS
Genetic and Phylogenetic Analysis
The HA genes of each virus were sequenced to determine the
molecular evolution of the two viruses. The sequences were
compared with representative H5N1 sequences obtained from
GenBank. According to antigenic characteristics by the WHO,
the HA gene of G2 belonged to clade 7.2, and that of G3 belonged
to clade 2.3.2.1 (Figure 1). Their HA genes had a series of basic
amino acids at the cleavage site of the HA (-RRRKR/GLF-), which
represents the high pathogenicity of the H5N1 AIVs in poultry
(Gohrbandt et al., 2011).
The amino acid sequences of the two viruses revealed five
conservative potential N-linked glycosylation sites in HA (26,
27, 39, 499, and 558): three in HA1 (26, 27, and 39) and two in
TABLE 1 | Cleavage site and potential glycosylation sites in HA of the two H5N1 HPAIVs (A/Chicken/China/G2/2012(H5N1) = G2 and
A/Duck/China/G3/2012(H5N1) = G3).
Strains Cleavage site potential glycosylation sites
342-347 26 27 39 155 169 178 209 251 301 499 558
-RRRKR/G- NNS NST NVT NSS NNT NNT NLT NDT NSS NGT NGS
G2 +a + + + NPS + −b − + + + +
G3 + + + + + − + − − NYS + +
aThe “+” means the amino acid sequences of glycosylation sites are same with list above.
bThe “−” means the glycosylation sites are lost.
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HA2 (499 and 558). In addition, the G2 virus lost two potential
N-linked glycosylation sites in 178 (NNT) and 209 (NPT), and
amino acids at 155 the glycosylation site changed from NSS
to NPS (Table 4). The G3 HA lost three potential N-linked
FIGURE 1 | Phylogenetic analysis of HA. The trees were constructed by
using the neighbor joining method with the Maximum Composite Likelihood
model and MEGA5 software with 1000 bootstrap replicates based on the
following sequences: HA (A), nucleotides (nt) 29–1732.
glycosylation sites in 169 (NNT), 209 (NPT) and 251 (NDT), and
amino acids at 301 the glycosylation site changed from NSS to
NYS (Table 1).
Pathogenicity of H5N1 HPAIVs in Chickens
To evaluate the pathogenicity of the two H5N1 HPAIVs, six
chickens of each group were inoculated intranasally with 100
µl 103 EID50 G2, G3, or PBS, respectively. All chickens in the
G3 group began to show clinical typical symptoms as early as
two DPI, and were dead by four DPI (Figure 2). However, the
inoculated chickens of the G2 group showed clinical signs by four
DPI, and all died by eight DPI (Figure 2). So the lethality of G2
and G3 viruses in chickens was 100% (Table 2).
Eyelid edema, insensibility, diminished appetite and thirst,
roughened hair coats, comb cyanosis, torticollis, ataxia, and
other neurological symptoms were observed among dead
chickens infected with G2 and G3. At necropsy of chickens
dead from infection we found slight petechial hemorrhaging
in subcutaneous fat, hyperaemia, haemorrhagia, and nig-
necrosis in the lungs; hepatomegaly and an amber liver; and
hyperaemia and haemorrhagia in the stomachus glandularis.
In short, both G2 and G3 viruses produced apparent clinical
symptoms and typical pathological changes in severe infected
chickens.
FIGURE 2 | Lethality of the G2 and G3 viruses in SPF chickens. The G2
infected chickens were inoculated intranasally with 100µl 103EID50 G2 viruses
and the G2 contact chickens were housed with them without inoculate. The
G3 infected chickens were inoculated intranasally with 100 ul 103EID50 G3
viruses and the G3 contact chickens were housed with them without inoculate.
TABLE 2 | Clinical situations and lethality of chickens after inoculated
intranasally with the two H5N1 HPAIVs (A/Chicken/China/G2/2012
(H5N1) = G2 and A/Duck/China/G3/2012(H5N1) = G3).
Strains Clinical symptom Virus shedding Survival
rates proportions
G2 Infecteda 100% 100% 0
Contactb 100% 0 100%
G3 Infected 100% 100% 0
Contact 100% 100% 0
Control 0 0 100%
aChickens inoculated with virus.
bContact chickens housed with those inoculated.
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To evaluate the replication of the two viruses in chickens,
three inoculated chickens in each group were euthanized at three
DPI, and the lungs, kidneys, liver, heart, spleen, and brain were
collected. Oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs were collected from
chickens of each group at 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 DPI. All of the tissues
and swabs were collected and titrated for virus infectivity. In G2
inoculated chickens, the virus replicated in all tested organs on
three DPI and the mean titers were 4.33 log EID50 in the heart,
2.92 log EID50 in the liver, 2.67 log EID50 in the spleen, 1.58 log
EID50 in the lungs, 3.67 log EID50 in the kidneys, and 3.25 log
EID50 in the brain (Table 3). In G3 virus inoculated chickens, the
virus replicated to higher and the mean titers were 5.25 log EID50
in the liver and 5.5 log EID50 in the heart, spleen, lungs, kidneys,
and brain, respectively (Table 3). Above all, the replication of G3
in chicken was much higher than that of G2.
In the G2 group, virus shedding was detected from the
oropharynx and cloaca swabs in inoculated chickens within seven
DPI. The virus titers from oropharynx swabs and cloacal swabs
were 2.92 and 1.96 log EID50, 2.63 and 1.88 log EID50, and
2.63 and 1.63 log EID50 on three DPI, five DPI, and seven DPI,
respectively (Table 4). All of the chickens in the G2 group died
within eight DPI. G3 virus shedding could be tested from both
oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs in inoculated chickens on three
DPI, and the virus titers were all 4.5 logEID50 (Table 4). All of
the chickens in the G3 group died within four DPI. These showed
that the duration of virus shedding of chickens infected with G2
was 8 days and was longer than the 4 days of G3, but the titers
of replication of G2 group were lower than that of G3. Therefore,
our results indicated that both G2 and G3 were highly pathogenic
to chickens, and the replication of the G3 virus was higher than
that of the G2.
Transmission of H5N1 HPAIVs in Chickens
To understand the naive contact transmission of these two
viruses, three SPF chickens were inoculated intranasally with
0.1ml PBS as naive control group and housed with inoculated
chickens of the G2 and G3 groups, respectively. Oropharyngeal
and cloacal swabs were collected from them at 3, 5, 7, 9, and
11 DPI. All surviving chickens were observed for 14 days. We
collected and titrated the tissues and swabs for virus infectivity.
During the observation period, the naive contact chickens in
the G2 group began to show mild clinical signs, such as spirits
atrophy and inappetence, by five DPI and thesemild clinical signs
disappeared by seven DPI, all chickens survived for 14 days and
TABLE 3 | Replication of the two H5N1 HPAIVs (A/Chicken/China/G2/2012(H5N1) = G2 and A/Duck/China/G3/2012(H5N1) = G3) in SPF chickensa.
Strains Virus titers in SPF chickens at 3 DPI (log10EID50/0.1ml) in
b
Heart Liver Spleen Lungs Kidneys Brain
G2 Infected 4.33± 0.52 2.92± 0.52 2.67± 0.14 1.58± 0.14 3.67± 0.52 3.25± 0.5
Contact 0 0 0 0 0 0
G3 Infected 5.5± 0 5.25± 0.43 5.5± 0 5.5± 0 5.5± 0 5.5± 0
Contact 5.5± 0 4.75± 0.66 5± 0.66 4.83± 0.63 5.25± 0.43 5.0± 0.43
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0
aSix SPF chickens were inoculated intranasally (i.n.) with 103 EID50 of virus in a 0.1ml volume in G2 and G3 group, and three naive contact chickens housed with them, respectively; on
3 DPI, three inoculated and all dead naive chickens in each group were euthanized, and virus titers were determined in samples of heart, liver, spleen, lungs, kidneys, and brain in eggs.
bFor statistical analysis, a value of 1.5 was assigned if the virus was not detected from the undiluted sample in three embryonated hen eggs (Sun et al., 2011). Virus titers are expressed
as means ± standard deviation in log10EID50/0.1ml of tissue.
TABLE 4 | Virus titers in oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs from chickens after inoculated with the two H5N1 HPAIVs (A/Chicken/China/G2/2012(H5N1) =
G2 and A/Duck/China/G3/2012(H5N1) = G3).
Strains Days post-inoculation (log10EID
50/0.1ml) ± SDa
3 day 5 day 7 day 9 day
Oropharyngeal
swabs
Cloacal
swabs
Oropharyngeal
swabs
Cloacal
swabs
Oropharyngeal
swabs
Cloacal
swabs
Oropharyngeal
swabs
Cloacal
swabs
G2 Infectedb 2.92 ± 1.11
(5/6)
1.96 ± 0.46
(5/6)
2.63 ± 0.18
(2/2)
1.88 ± 0.53
(1/2)
2.63 ± 0.18
(2/2)
1.63 ± 0.18
(1/2)
NDd ND
Contactc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
G3 Infected 4.5 ± 0(1/1) 4.5 ± 0(1/1) ND – – – – –
Contact 4.5 ± 0(2/2) 4.5 ± 0(2/2) ND – – – – –
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
aFor statistical purposes, a value of 1.5 was assigned if virus was not detected from the undiluted sample in three embryonated hen’s eggs (Sun et al., 2011).
bChickens inoculated with virus.
cContact chickens housed with those inoculated.
dND: not detected. Chickens all died.
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the seroconversion rate was 100%. The naive contact chickens
in the G3 group began to show clinical signs by two DPI and
all died by four DPI (Figure 2). In the G3 naive contact group,
virus replication titers were 5.5 log EID50 in the heart, 4.75 log
EID50 in the liver, 5 log EID50 in the spleen, 4.83 log EID50 in
the lungs, 5.25 log EID50 in the kidneys, and 5 log EID50 in
the brain (Table 3). However, no virus was detected in tissue
samples of the G2 naive contact group. All of the naive contact
chickens in G3 group could shed virus from the oropharynx and
cloaca swabs; the virus titers were both 4.5 log EID50 at three
DPI, which was the same as that of inoculated chickens (Table 4).
In the chickens of the G2 naive contact group, virus shedding
could not be detected all along (Table 4). These showed that the
lethality of naive contact chickens of G3 was 100% and that of G2
was 0 although both G2 and G3 had naive contact transmission
in chickens (Table 2). So G3 virus had stronger transmissibility
between chickens by naive contact than G2.
Antigenic Variation of HPAIV and Protective
Efficacy of Current Commercial Vaccines
To characterize antigenic variation of the two H5N1 HPAIVs
and the current commercially vaccines strains, we carried out
the cross reactive HI assay. The cross reactive HI antibody
titers of anti-Re-4, anti-Re-6, and anti-D7 serum in reaction
with G2 antigen were 5 log2, 1 log2, and 2 log2, respectively;
and those in reaction with G3 antigen were 5 log2, 6 log2,
and 9 log2, respectively (Table 5). Our results showed that the
antigens of G2 and G3 were very different from those of vaccine
isolates. Therefore, we should assess the immunogenicity and
effectiveness of three current commercially inactivated vaccines
against these isolates in 2012 in Guangdong of China.
Because H5N1 HPAIVs of clade 2.3.2.1 have most isolates
from Guangdong in 2012, we estimated the effectiveness of
current commercial vaccines against G3. Three-week-old SPF
chickens were immunized with inactivated vaccines such as Re-4,
Re-6, and D7, respectively. Serum from every group was collected
at 14 and 28 DPV for HI test, respectively. Then, all chickens at
28 DPV were challenged intranasally with 200 µl 106 EID50 of
G3. In the Re-4 group, chickens were challenged with G3 when
the mean HI titer was 9.4 log2 at 28 DPV. The chickens began
to show clinical symptoms on three DPI and die on six DPI,
shedding virus was tested on three to nine DPI, and the mortality
and virus shedding proportion were 33.3 and 88.9%, respectively
(Table 6). In the Re-6 group, chickens were challenged when the
mean HI titer was 7.0 log2 at 28 DPV. The chickens began to die
on six DPI, virus shedding was detected on three to eleven DPI,
and the mortality and virus shedding proportion were 11.1 and
44.4%, respectively (Table 6). Those results showed that the Re-6
vaccine has a certain degree of protection against the G3 virus. In
the D7 group, chickens were challenged when the mean HI titer
was 7.4 log2 at 28 DPV, and no virus shedding or death was found
during the observation period (Table 6). In the non-immunized
control group, the HI titer was zero. All chickens were detected
virus shedding and died during the observation period. These
findings showed that the protection rate of the D7 vaccine against
G3 was 100%, that of Re-6 was 88.9%, and Re-4 was 66.7%.
TABLE 5 | Cross reactive hemagglutination inhibition (HI)a antibody titers
of anti-serum against five avian influenza virus antigens.
Strains Clade Serum of HI titers (log2)
Re-4 Re-6 D7 G2 G3
Re-4 7 10 3 8 2 5
Re-6 2.3.2 5 8 10 1 10
D7 2.3.2 5 6 9 1 9
G2 7.2 5 1 2 8 5
G3 2.3.2.1 5 6 9 0 10
aThe cross reactive HI assays were carried out according to WHO standard method.
TABLE 6 | Results of hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers from serum
samples of chickens at 28 DPV. And the protection rates of three vaccines
against G3 virus challangeda.
Groups Before challenged Post-challenge Survival rate (%)
HI antibody titersb
(log2)
Viruses
shedding (%)
Re-4 9.40c 88.9 66.7
Re-6 7.20 44.4 88.9
D7 7.50 0 100
Control 0 100 0
aThirty-six three-week-old SPF chickens were divided into four groups and immunized
with inactivated Re-4, Re-6, D7, and PBS respectively. At 28 DPV, all chickens were
challenged intranasally with 200 ul 106 EID50 of G3.
bSerum samples from Re-4 group, Re-6 group, and D7 group were detected with Re-4,
Re-6, and D7 inactivated antigens, respectively. Serum samples from control group were
detected simultaneously with Re-4, Re-6, and D7 inactivated antigens.
cGeometric mean titer (GMT).
In a word, the mean HI titers in all immune groups were
higher than 6 log2, which indicated that these three commercial
vaccines (Re-4, Re-6, and D7) had good immunogenicity in
chickens. And the results of challenge study showed that these
vaccines gave certain protection against G3, but their protection
rates were different. Combined with the results of the cross
reactive HI assay, we found that some vaccine strains were
not antigenically well-matched with epidemic isolates, so the
protective effects of the three vaccines varied.
DISCUSSION
The first H5N1 HPAIV in China was isolated from sick geese in
Guangdong province in 1996 (Xu et al., 1999). In the following
years, H5N1 HPAIVs repeatedly caused serious outbreaks in
South China, especially in Hong Kong, and resulted in heavy
losses of economy and life. Most of H5N1 viruses rapidly spread
and induced large numbers of death within 2 or 3 days in
chickens. The ducks and geese infected H5N1 HPAIVs showed
no clinical symptoms in the past, but new H5N1 HPAIVs could
attacked ducks and/or geese and caused deaths in recent years (Li
et al., 2010). In addition, more andmoremammal was susceptible
to H5N1 HPAIV by natural or laboratory infections. Felines,
including cat, tiger, lion, leopard, clouded leopard, and Asiatic
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golden cat were highly susceptible to H5N1 HPAIV (Reperant
et al., 2009). The domestic dog, hamster, rhesus macaque,
cynomolgus, palm civet, red fox and raccoon could be potentially
fatal by H5N1 HPAIV. Pika, domesticated swine, cattle, donkey,
rat, and rabbit can exhibit asymptomatic or nonfatal infections
by H5N1 HPAIV (U.S. Geological Survey, 2011). From 2010
to 2013 the dominant clades of H5N1 HPAIVs co-circulating
in South China were 2.3.2.1 and 7.2 although other clades,
such as 2.3.4, had occasionally been detected (World Health
Organization, 2013a). In our study, the G2 and G3 strains from
poultry in Guangdong in 2012 belonged to clades 7.2 and 2.3.2.1,
respectively. The inoculation dose was mostly 106 EID50 or 10
5
EID50 in previous pathogenicity studies, but here we selected
a medium infective dose (103 EID50) to observe the difference
of pathogenicity and transmission of the H5N1 HPAIVs. This
might be one of the reasons why the naive contact chickens in
G2 group showed mild clinical symptoms without any viruses
shedding or death. In our study, both G2 and G3 virus could
highly replicated in the heart, liver, brain, spleen, kidneys, and
lungs of infected chickens, virus shedding could be detected from
all infected chickens during survival, and the lethal rates were
both 100%. These results showed that G2 and G3 virus had high
pathogenicity to chickens. By this token, the new H5N1 HPAIVs
of these two clades in South China still had high pathogenicity to
chickens.
AIV could form an aerosol and horizontal transmission
through the respiratory tract in poultry. In recent years, the
dominant AIVs co-circulated in mainland China were H5 and
H9 subtypes, of which H9 subtype AIVs have strong horizontal
transmission. However, only some H5 AIVs had horizontal
transmission ability (World Health Organization, 2013a). In our
previous studies, some H5N1 AIVs, which belonged to clades 0,
2.3.2.2, 7.2, and 9, could horizontally transmit between chickens,
ducks, geese, Japanese quails, and mice (Sun et al., 2011). Here,
G2 and G3 virus belonged to clades 7.2 and 2.3.2.1, respectively,
and both of them could transmit horizontally in chickens. All
of the naive contact chickens in the G3 group had detected
viruses shedding and replication in organs, but the naive contact
chickens in the G2 group only had mild clinical symptoms
and had no death or virus shedding. These results showed the
new H5N1 HPAIVs of these two clades had different horizontal
transmission ability. Moreover, H5N1HPAIV of clade 2.3.2.1 still
have been circulating in poultry and wild bird up to now, so they
will continue to have the threat to human health and poultry
product.
In China, poultry production modes, including rural
household scatter breeding, poultry farms, and modern
poultry ranches, are multiple and complicated so that
prevention and control of H5 HPAI are difficult. Therefore,
all poultry in China were immunized with H5N1 vaccinations
compulsorily. In recent decades, several H5 vaccines, especially
H5 inactivated vaccines, were widely used in China due to
constant mutation and evolution of the virus (Swayne, 2012).
The first commercial flu vaccine in China was an H5N2
inactivated vaccine, which used the low pathogenic avian
influenza H5N2 virus A/Turkey/England/N-28/1973 and was
approved for use in August of 2003 (Chen and Bu, 2009).
Then the Re-1 vaccine was approved for use in 2004, for which
was antigenically well-matched the epidemic strains at that
time. In 2006, the H5N1 Re-4 vaccine, whose strain belonged
to clade 7, was approved into service in China and widely
used in the northern mainland. In 2008, new Re-5 vaccine
began to be used in northern and southern China, whose
strain A/duck/Anhui/1/2006(H5N1) belonged to clade 2.3.4
(Jiang et al., 2010; Li et al., 2010). In 2012, the recombinant
vaccine Re-6 was also approved for use in the mainland to
control new epidemic strains in clade 2.3.2. In 2013, a new
H5 vaccine D7 was approved for use in waterfowl, which
used an H5N2 virus (A/duck/Guangdong/D7/2007) belonged
to clade 2.3.2. In conclusion, although flu vaccines were
updated constantly, new strains still continue to appear in
China. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness
and effects of current vaccines against the new strains
timely.
From 2011 to 2012,most H5 isolates circulating inGuangdong
province belonged to clade 2.3.2.1, including G3, so we wanted
to estimate the effectiveness of current vaccines against them. In
our study, the effectiveness of these three commercial vaccines
against G3 varied. The D7 vaccine provided 100% protection
to chickens against G3, the Re-6 vaccine provided 88.9%
protection, and the Re-4 vaccine only provided 66.7%. The
antibody titer of Re-4 in chicken had more 2 log2 than Re-
6 and D7 when challenged at 28 DPV, but the protection rate
of Re-4 against G3 was lowest because the Re-4 vaccine strain
and G3 belonged to different clades. These results indicated
that Re-4 vaccine did not protect chickens against H5 viruses
challenging although had good immunogenicity and could
induce high antibody levels. The D7 vaccine provided the best
protection in these three vaccines against G3, whose strain
belonged to clade 2.3.2. These told us that high antibody
levels did not provide good protection, what need antigen
matching between vaccine and epidemic strains. Therefore, to
evaluate vaccines more objectively and effectively, we should be
concerned not only about antibody level of immunized animals
but also antigen matching between vaccine strains and epidemic
isolates when observed the protection of vaccines in clinical
practices.
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